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Monitoring Corporate Boards: Evidence from China 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
China’s listed companies have two-tier boards comprising of a supervisory board and a board 
of directors. The supervisory board has the responsibility to oversee and monitor the board of 
directors. Similarly, the role of the independent non-executive directors (INEDs) is to advise 
and monitor directors. In this paper we investigate the main board structure hypotheses 
namely the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses for a sample of 
Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) floated on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. Our results provide evidence to support the three hypotheses. Interestingly we 
find that the larger the size of the board of directors, the larger the supervisory board size. 
Moreover, we find that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board 
size and this implies that INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ 
monitoring role. Finally, we argue that as the Chinese governance structure combines both 
the German and the Anglo-Saxon models, this creates a conflict between the two boards with 
respect to the monitoring role.  Our results, therefore call for a comprehensive reform in the 
Chinese governance mechanism. 
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Monitoring Corporate Boards: Evidence from China 
 
1. Introduction 
Chinese listed companies have dual boards namely a supervisory board and a board of 
directors. However China’s dual board structure differs from the two-tier board mechanism in 
continental Europe in which the supervisory board appoints the directors on the management 
board and that management board comprises only of executive directors. According to the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China 2001
1
 (hereafter ‘the Code’) 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, 2001a), there is no 
hierarchical relationship between the two boards and both boards report to the shareholders. 
Directors and supervisors are usually nominated by controlling shareholders and institutional 
investors but are eventually appointed by the shareholders.  In practice the state plays a 
significant role in appointing directors and supervisors on the supervisory board (Kato and 
Long, 2006 and Firth et al., 2009). 
 
The board of directors comprises of executive, non-executive and independent non-executive 
directors (INEDs). The main responsibility of the INEDs is to monitor and advise directors 
and to protect the overall interests of the company and minority shareholders in particular. On 
the other hand, the supervisory board has the responsibility to monitor the acts of directors 
and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and to review the financial affairs of the company. 
Therefore, we argue that there might be a conflict in roles between the supervisory board and 
the INEDs and hence it is interesting to investigate the monitoring hypothesis and the main 
determinants of the board of directors and the supervisory board structure for Chinese 
companies. 
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The Chinese economy has an increasing power worldwide. There has been a remarkable 
growth in the Chinese IPO market compared with other emerging markets. For instance, in 
2007, China was declared the top country with respect to the number of IPO new issues
2
 (Xu 
and Oh, 2011). However, in 2012, there was a sharp decline (62%) in funds raised through 
IPOs; therefore, the CSRC suspended the approval of new IPOs in October 2012
3
. We argue 
that little is known about IPOs’ board structure overall and the Chinese IPOs in particular, as 
the existing literature tends to focus on the US (Boone et al., 2007; and Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). 
 
Our study addresses these limitations. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to investigate the main board structure hypotheses, the determinants of the two-tier 
board structure for Chinese IPOs and the interrelationship and the potential conflict between 
the two boards with respect to the monitoring role. Studying IPOs’ board structure is 
interesting and our dataset of young companies is unique as we can monitor their evolution 
over time (Boone et al., 2007). On the other hand, IPOs are subject to substantial changes in 
governance mechanisms post-IPO as they are expected to adopt more value-maximising 
governance characteristics (Baker and Gompers, 2003).  Therefore, we argue that studying 
the determinants of IPOs’ board structure is timely and may offer new insights to the 
literature on corporate governance.  
 
Motivated by Baker and Gompers (2003); Boone et al (2007); and Hermalin and Weisbach, 
(2003), this paper investigates the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of 
operations, monitoring and negotiation and the determinants of the board of directors’ size, 
the supervisory board size in addition to the inter-relationships between the two boards for a 
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sample of Chinese IPOs floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the 
period 1999-2009 tracked for at least four years since the IPO year until 2012. This allows us 
to measure the evolution of corporate boards over the life cycle of a company. Moreover, 
since the influence of board structure on financial performance has been investigated in the 
literature in different institutional settings (e.g. Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), our paper 
extends this debate in the corporate governance literature and investigates the board structure-
financial performance nexus for Chinese IPOs. We believe that companies should appoint 
experienced and talented directors to the board of directors so that they are able to achieve 
shareholders’ objectives and hence boost the economy.  
 
Using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and propensity score matching 
(PSM) techniques, we find evidence of the scope of operations hypothesis and that boards of 
directors of more complex companies tend to be larger. Interestingly we find that the higher 
the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies that INEDs 
are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. More 
interestingly, we find that the state - as a controlling shareholder- may influence and enforce 
the appointment of supervisors on the supervisory boards to carry out the monitoring role. 
This argument is consistent with Dahya et al (2003) as they argue that supervisors in reality 
act as the voice of the government and the ruling party. 
 
We also find consistent results with Jensen (1986) and Boone et al (2007) with respect to the 
monitoring hypothesis as the greater the private benefits of directors the larger the board of 
directors’ size. Moreover, the higher the monitoring costs the smaller the board size. 
Therefore, board structure is the outcome of the relationship between directors’ private 
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benefits and the cost of monitoring. Finally, we find consistent results with the negotiation 
hypothesis, as the Chinese board independence is determined as a trade-off between CEOs’ 
influence and the constraints on this influence.   
 
Our paper has clear policy implications for the Chinese regulator. We argue that supervisory 
boards in China play no significant role in corporate governance and have no actual power to 
oversee and monitor the board of directors as intended and stated in the Chinese Company 
Law (Clarke, 2006). This is mainly due to the potential conflict in roles between supervisors 
and INEDs on the board of directors and the overall overlap of duties between the two 
boards. This dilutes the power of both boards and increases directors’ and supervisors’ 
compensation schemes (CFA Institute, 2007). Therefore, the governance mechanism 
followed by Chinese companies is a quasi-two-tier structure (CFA Institute, 2007). 
 
Our results reveal the need for the regulator to reconsider the roles of either INEDs or the 
supervisory board members for, at least, listed companies or non-state-owned companies 
within a comprehensive reform of the Chinese governance mechanism.  This is due to the 
clear conflict in the monitoring role between the supervisory board members and the INEDs 
on the board of directors. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next 
section discusses the institutional background and board structure dynamics in China. Section 
3 presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Sections 4 and 5 present a 
description of our dataset and the empirical modelling respectively. Section 6 presents the 
results of our empirical analysis and finally, we discuss the implications of the results in 
section 7.  
 
 
6 
 
 
2. Institutional Background  
Chinese listed companies have a two-tier (dual) governance structure that comprises a 
supervisory board/committee and a board of directors. The two boards are independent as 
there is no hierarchical relationship between them. The Chinese government and the ruling 
party influence the appointment of the directors and supervisors on the supervisory board 
(Kato and Long, 2006). Fan et al (2007) find that 27% of CEOs of the newly privatised 
companies are politically connected and this leads to 18% lower stock returns than IPOs with 
non-politically connected CEOs. Firth et al (2009) argue that politically connected directors 
do not necessarily have sufficient experience and managerial know-how. 
 
According to the Company Law (2013, Article 108) and the Code, the size of the board of 
directors of a joint stock limited company ranges from 3 to 13directors
4
. The board of 
directors should also include independent directors who may not hold any other positions in 
the listed company. Their main responsibilities are to protect the overall interests of the 
company and minority shareholders in particular. Independent directors should carry out their 
duties independently away from any influence of the company's major shareholders, or any 
other interested parties. Moreover, independent directors have the power to postpone the 
board of directors meeting or to postpone the discussion on a particular matter when two or 
more independent directors find that the materials provided by the board of directors before 
the meeting are not adequate or unclear. 
 
Finally, the supervisory board consists of at least three supervisors, one of whom represents 
shareholders and another democratically elected employee representative (apart from the 
General Manager and the Chief Financial Officer) (Article 51 of the Company Law, 2013). 
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The board of supervisors has the following authorities among others
5: “to examine the 
company's financial affairs; to supervise the execution of company duties by the directors 
and the senior officers and to recommend the removal of directors and senior officers that 
violate laws, administrative regulations, the articles of association of the company or the 
resolutions of general meeting; ….” (Article 53 of the Company Law, 2013).  
Supervisors should have professional knowledge and experience in law and accounting. The 
members and the structure of the supervisory board shall ensure its capability to 
independently and efficiently conduct its supervision of directors, managers and other senior 
management personnel and to supervise and examine the company's financial matters, (The 
Code, Article 64). The Code also states that directors/supervisors should be nominated by 
controlling shareholders based on their professional knowledge. However, appointing 
directors in state-owned companies is influenced by both central and provincial governments 
to ensure companies’ compliance with government policies (Pessarossi and Weill, 2013, 
Chang and Wong, 2009 and Li and Tang, 2010). 
 
Yang et al (2011) argue that the supervisory boards are unable to influence the decisions 
made by the board of directors as supervisors usually have less experience and are not 
qualified enough to monitor the board of directors. We argue that this may lead to the 
appointment of less profiled - but loyal - directors in state-owned companies and hence 
undermines a major internal corporate governance mechanism (Pessarossi and Weill, 2013 
and Farag and Mallin 2016). 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The literature on board structure has largely investigated three main hypotheses namely the 
scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses (Boone et al., 2007). In this 
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section we present the literature on the three board structure hypotheses and the main 
determinants and dynamics of the unique Chinese board structure. Finally, we present the 
literature on the relationship between board structure and financial performance.   
 
3.1 The Scope of Operations Hypothesis 
Companies with different product lines and those operating in different segments or 
geographical areas usually have high growth opportunities and tend to be more complex 
(Boone et al., 2007 and Coles et al., 2008). As companies grow and expand, they might need 
more directors with specific expertise and knowledge to help oversee managers’ 
performance (Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001 and 
Lehn et al., 2009). Therefore, the scope of operations hypothesis states that large and 
complex companies need larger boards to better perform the monitoring and advising roles 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983, and Coles et al., 2008).  
 
The human capital theory states that larger boards may have more diverse opinions and hence 
better quality decisions are likely to be made (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991). However, larger boards 
are subject to more agency problems. Therefore, they are associated with a higher proportion 
of INEDs to better monitor their scope of operations (Boone et al., 2007). Coles et al (2008) 
find that complex companies have greater advising requirements and hence have larger 
boards with a higher proportion of INEDs. Jensen (1993) argues that large boards with more 
than seven or eight directors may have communication and coordination problems and hence 
have less effective monitoring and advising roles and this enables CEOs to influence and 
control the board easily. Yermack (1996) finds that the smaller the board of directors’ size, 
the more effective the monitoring and advising roles.  Cheng (2008) argues that it usually 
takes more negotiation and hence a longer time to reach a final decision in a larger board.  
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We agree with Linck et al (2008) as they conclude that board structure is a trade-off between 
the costs and benefits of a board’s monitoring and advising roles. Therefore, based on the 
scope of operations hypothesis, we expect that there should be a positive relationship between 
the scope and complexity of the firm’s operations proxied by company size and both board 
size and independence. 
 
Few studies have been conducted in the Chinese setting. Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) find that 
firm complexity drives board size whereas regulations mainly drive board independence.  
Moreover, they find a negative relationship between board independence and both 
supervisory board size and the proportion of state-ownership. However, no other studies have 
investigated the determinants of the supervisory board size in China. Therefore, we are trying 
to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
We argue that the role of the supervisory board is controversial. Using interview data, Dahya 
et al (2003) find that the Chinese supervisory boards in reality act as an honoured guest, a 
friendly advisor, or a censored watchdog. Therefore, they argue that there is a need to 
strengthen the functioning and independence of the supervisory boards in China. Using the 
grounded theory methodology, Xiao et al (2004) find that the role of the supervisory boards is 
limited overall and that the main determinants of the supervisory board role are the influence 
of the Communist Party and the government, the role of independent directors and the power 
of the board of directors. Finally, they argue that the existence of independent directors 
affects the future of the supervisory boards.  
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Board structure and governance characteristics have not been a significant area of research in 
the IPO literature. Boone et al (2007) track the developments in corporate board structure for 
IPOs in the US and find evidence to support the scope of operations hypothesis. They find a 
positive relationship between both company size and age and both board size and 
independence. They argue that more complex companies may need larger and more 
independent boards. Chancharat et al (2012) find an association between board independence 
and the survival of Australian IPOs. They conclude that the optimal board structure is mainly 
determined by company and industry characteristics. Moreover, they argue that executive 
directors may also enhance board effectiveness where INEDs face higher information 
processing costs (Chancharat et al., 2012). Below, we formulate our first hypothesis; 
however, as most of previous literature focuses on different settings, the results could differ 
from previous research.  
 
H1: The greater the degree of company complexity the larger its board size and 
independence. 
 
3.2 The Monitoring Hypothesis 
Complex and more diversified companies may need specific expertise in monitoring 
management and this may increase monitoring costs (Linck et al., 2008 and Coles et al., 
2008). Linck et al (2008) argue that the higher the monitoring cost, the smaller the board size 
and independence. The monitoring hypothesis states that corporate business environment has 
an influence on monitoring activities (Boone et al., 2007).  Gillan et al (2004) argue that in 
noisy environments e.g. high-growth, companies tend to monitor less compared with less 
noisy business environments (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Coles et al (2008) find that fast 
growth companies may have smaller boards and a lower proportion of INEDs due to the high 
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monitoring costs. They argue that uncertainty increases monitoring costs and thus companies 
operating in noisy environments rely on insiders as they have company-specific knowledge.  
Linck et al (2008) find that companies with greater information asymmetry have smaller 
boards and a high proportion of executive directors. Lehn et al (2009) find a negative 
relationship between board size and market-to-book value as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. Boone et al (2007) and Linck et al (2008) argue that the larger the board size 
the less effective the monitoring role due to free-riding problems. The monitoring hypothesis 
predicts that companies tend to have large boards when the benefits from appointing 
additional directors outweigh the monitoring costs and this mainly depends on the company 
characteristics (Boone et al., 2007). Therefore, Boone et al (2007) argue that board size and 
independence are positively correlated with directors’ private benefits and negatively 
correlated with monitoring costs.  
 
The Chinese experience on the other hand provides interesting insights with respect to the 
monitoring hypothesis. It is well documented in the literature that the supervisory board is 
unlikely to have an effective monitoring role as in reality it acts as the voice of the 
government and the ruling party (Dahya et al., 2003).  Therefore the CSRC issued guidelines 
on the introduction of independent directors in August 2001 to enhance the monitoring role 
(CSRC, 2001b).  Wang (2008) argues that INEDs have made improvements to the 
governance mechanism in China compared with the role of the supervisory board. 
 
However, Lu (2005) argues that INEDs have no actual role given the insiders’ influence 
which does not provide a healthy environment for INEDs to exercise their monitoring role 
over directors. Li et al (2012) find a performance gap with respect to the control and strategic 
roles of INEDs due to the lack of their time commitment, lack of objectivity and limited 
12 
 
 
expertise. Therefore, we argue that the potential conflict in roles between INEDs and the 
supervisory board may influence the overall board effectiveness. Based on the above 
discussion we formulate our second and third hypotheses. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between directors’ private benefits and both board size 
and independence. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between monitoring costs and both board size and 
independence. 
 
3.3 The Negotiation Hypothesis 
Successful CEOs have bargaining power and an influence on appointing insiders and 
affiliated INEDs (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998 and Boone et al., 2007). Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) argue that CEOs in profitable companies may use their power to influence 
the appointment of loyal INEDs. However, the presence of venture capitalists (VCs) and 
other institutional investors might impose constraints on CEOs’ power (Boone et al., 2007). 
Boone et al (2007) find a negative and significant relationship between CEO power proxied 
by both CEO’s share ownership and tenure and board independence; however, they find that 
the latter is positively related to the constraints on CEO’s influence. Therefore, the 
negotiation hypothesis states that there is a negative relationship between CEO’s power and 
the proportion of INEDs; however, the proportion of INEDs is positively related to the 
constraints on CEO’s influence. 
 
Similarly, Baker and Gompers (2003) investigate the main determinants of board structure 
for VC-backed IPOs and find a negative and significant relationship between CEO power 
(proxied by tenure and voting control) and the proportion of INEDs. However, they find that 
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the proportion of INEDs is positively associated with the power of outside investors e.g. VCs 
and that board structure is the outcome of the bargaining power between CEOs and outside 
investors. Raheja (2005) finds that board structure influences the information flow and that an 
optimal board size and composition depend on company and directors’ characteristics.   
 
The Chinese board structure is a rich environment that has unique interrelationships between 
CEOs and INEDs. Ma and Khanna (2015) investigate the role of INEDs and find that as 
INEDs “feel indebted for being offered a director position”, they usually offer their support 
to top management. Wang (2008) claims that INEDs have made a limited contribution to the 
Chinese corporate governance and that there should be a fundamental regulatory reform to 
enhance both the overall board effectiveness and the relationship between the board of 
directors and the supervisory board. Furthermore, Wang (2008) argues that political 
connections on the two boards play a fundamental role in shaping the relationships between 
insiders and outsiders. Based on the above discussion, we formulate our fourth and fifth 
hypotheses. 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between CEOs’ influence and the proportion of INEDs. 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the limitations on CEOs’ influence and the 
proportion of INEDs.  
 
3.5 Board Structure and Financial Performance 
The influence of board structure on financial performance has been investigated in the 
literature in different institutional settings. The results are largely in favour of a negative 
association between board size and financial performance.  The proponents of the negative 
association between board size and financial performance argue that the larger the board size 
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the greater the agency conflicts in addition to the coordination/communication problems 
(Jensen, 1993). Yermack (1996) finds a negative and significant relationship between board 
size and company valuation. Using a large UK dataset, Guest (2009) finds a negative and 
significant relationship between board size and financial performance due to communication 
problems amongst board directors. On the other hand, a few studies find a positive 
association between board size and financial performance e.g. Prevost et al (2002) in New 
Zealand. Moreover, Li and Naughton (2007) find a positive and significant relationship 
between board size and IPOs’ short-term returns. 
 
Similarly, there has been a disagreement in the corporate governance literature on the impact 
of board independence. However, most of the existing studies largely find a positive 
relationship between board independence and financial performance. Cho and Rui (2009) 
find a positive and significant influence of the proportion of INEDs on financial performance 
in China. However, they find a negative and significant relationship between stock returns 
reaction to the reported earnings and the proportion of INEDs. Bezemer et al (2014) claim 
that Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) in two-tier boards may face some challenges including 
information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Omran (2009) finds a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of INEDs 
and financial performance post IPO. He claims that post IPO, the change in ownership 
structure of state-owned companies is not effective unless the state gives up control and this 
may lead to an enhancement in financial performance post IPO. Peng (2004) finds that the 
proportion of INEDs has little influence on financial performance measured by return on 
equity (ROE). Firth et al (2007) find that a higher proportion of INEDs may lead to greater 
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earnings informativeness and this has a positive impact on investors’ confidence in the 
financial statements.  Based on the above discussion we formulate the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between both board of directors and supervisory board 
size and financial performance 
H7: There is a positive relationship between board of directors’ independence and financial 
performance 
 
4. Data and Sample 
We collect data on non-financial Chinese IPOs floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges over the period 1999-2009. We track the changes in board structure from the 
IPO launch year until 2012. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel that comprises of 892 
IPOs and 8006 company-year observations. Data is collected from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database which is designed and developed by GTA 
Information Technology Corporation. Our dependent variable is board structure proxied by 
board of directors’ size, supervisory board size and the proportion of INEDs on the board of 
directors. Board size is measured by the total number of directors/supervisors on both the 
board of directors and the supervisory board. Board independence is measured by the 
proportion of INEDs on the board of directors.  
 
Our independent variables are proxies for our three main hypotheses. We use company size, 
age and the leverage ratio as alternative proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis 
following Boone et al (2007) and Linck et al (2008). We use companies’ natural log of total 
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assets as a proxy for company size. We also use companies’ age since IPO and since the 
establishment date as alternative proxies for company age. Moreover, we use the ratio of total 
debt to total assets as a proxy for leverage. The scope of operations hypothesis predicts a 
positive relationship between company size, age and debt/total assets ratio and both board 
size and independence. We also posit the same relationship applies with respect to the 
supervisory board size. 
 
The monitoring hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between directors’ private 
benefits’ proxies and both board size and independence. To test the monitoring hypothesis, 
we use both companies’ free cash flow and industry concentration as proxies for the potential 
private benefits following Boone et al (2007), Guest (2008) and Coles et al (2008). Free cash 
flow is measured as (earnings plus depreciation minus capital expenditures) /total assets. 
Industry concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index of industry sales. Jensen (1986) 
and Boone et al (2007) argue that directors may use cash flow to achieve private benefits 
rather than maximising shareholders’ wealth. Moreover, directors in highly concentrated 
industries have the power to consume private benefits as they are less subject to market 
discipline (Boone et al., 2007). 
 
The monitoring hypothesis also predicts a negative relationship between monitoring costs and 
both board size and independence. We argue that fast growing companies or those with 
higher market -to-book ratio and greater volatility have higher growth opportunities and 
higher monitoring costs. Boone et al (2007) argue that high volatility may imply high 
uncertainty about the future cash flows and hence complicates the mission of INEDs with 
respect to their monitoring role. Pathan (2009), Linck et al (2008) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2007) find that board structure reduces company uncertainty. Moreover, directors’ 
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ownership mitigates agency conflicts that arise from high monitoring costs in some industries 
e.g. fast growth industries (Boone et al., 2007). 
 
Therefore, we use the natural log of market-to-book ratio and the annualised standard 
deviation of daily stock returns as proxies for the cost of monitoring following Boone et al 
(2007) and Linck et al (2008). Market-to-book ratio is calculated as (book value of debt + 
market value of equity) / book value of assets. Daily stock returns are calculated as the first 
difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days 
adjusted for dividends, rights issues, stock dividends, and stock splits. We also use the 
proportion of directors’ ownership and a fast growth dummy that is equal to one for fast 
growth companies and 0 otherwise as proxies for the cost of monitoring. Therefore, 
according to the monitoring hypothesis, we expect a negative relationship between both 
board size and independence and the log of market-to-book ratio, the annualised standard 
deviation of daily stock returns, the fast growth dummy and directors’ ownership. 
 
The negotiation hypothesis predicts a negative association between the proportion of INEDs 
and the proxies for CEOs’ influence and a positive association with the constraints on their 
influence (Boone et al., 2007).  To test the negotiation hypothesis and whether board 
composition reflects the potential negotiation between CEOs and INEDs following Boone et 
al (2007) and Coles et al (2008), we use four proxies namely CEO tenure, age, gender and 
state share ownership. CEO tenure is measured by the number of years that a CEO has spent 
in this role. CEO gender is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a CEO 
is female and 0 otherwise. The Chinese government still owns considerable controlling 
shareholdings in listed companies (Sun and Tong 2003).  We argue that state ownership may 
influence board structure and the relationship between executive directors and INEDs.  CEO 
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tenure reflects board entrenchment as longer tenured CEOs may have more influence on the 
appointment of INEDs. We also argue that CEOs’ characteristics e.g. age and gender can be 
used as proxies for their influence. Younger directors and female directors may have different 
perspectives and hence may have an influence on the appointment of INEDs. 
 
To measure the constraints on CEOs’ influence in the Chinese context, we use three proxies 
namely CEO’s political connections, the proportion of academics on the board of directors 
and the proportion of shares owned by supervisory board members. Foreign directors and 
VCs may also influence CEO’s ability to appoint INEDs (Boone et al., 2007). Therefore, as a 
robustness check we use the proportion of foreign directors on the board of directors and the 
VC backed IPOs dummy as alternative proxies for CEOs’ influence.  
 
Furthermore, we use other control variables that may drive our results e.g. IPO proceeds and 
the number of IPO shares as alternative proxies for IPO size following the study of Butler et 
al (2014).  We use different measures of financial performance (accounting and market based 
measures) e.g. return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (market value of equity + book value of 
debt and the book value of preferred stocks/ book value of total assets). Finally, we create a 
set of industry and year dummies to control for the potential inter-industry and time specific 
effects. Table 1 presents a description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
 
5. Empirical Modelling 
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Endogeneity between both board size and independence and financial performance may lead 
to spurious correlations due to the omitted unobservable company characteristics e.g. 
corporate culture, norms which are assumed to be time invariant during the period of study, 
(Farag and Mallin, 2016). To investigate the main determinants of Chinese IPOs’ two-tier 
board structure and the influence of board structure on financial performance, we carefully 
address the endogeneity concerns using four strategies; firstly, we control for industry fixed 
effects in all models to control for unobservable characteristics and underlying economic 
indicators and environment (e.g. market conditions, competition and technology) which may 
drive the results (Adams and Ferreira, 2009, Boone et al., 2007, Coles et al., 2008, Cheng, 
2008 and Farag and Mallin, 2016).  
 
Secondly, following Farag and Mallin (2016) we use the system GMM estimator
6
 of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) as a robustness check to address the dynamic nature of board structure and 
the potential reverse causality in the estimation. The use of historical values of suspect 
endogenous variables as internal instruments is widely used in the literature to control for 
simultaneity and other sources of endogeneity and that a higher order of lag length results in 
more exogenous instruments
7
; see for example Roodman (2009); Wintoki et al (2012) and 
Farag and Mallin (2016). Therefore, following Wintoki et al (2012), we use four lags of 
suspect endogenous variables as instruments in the equation in first-differences, and three 
lags of their difference as instruments in the equation in levels. We also use both the Hansen 
over-identification test and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for first- and second-order 
autocorrelation to measure the validity of our instruments and the validity of moments 
conditions used respectively. Moreover, we estimate robust standard errors clustered at the 
company level to produce robust, reliable and unbiased coefficient estimates. 
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Thirdly, we use the PSM technique to control for observable differences in company and 
industry characteristics using the nearest neighbour technique with replacement and common 
support and within a maximum distance of 1% following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
Abadie and Imbens (2006). Our treatment and control groups are IPOs and non-IPOs 
respectively. We match our sample of IPOs with that of non-IPOs with similar characteristics 
namely company size, profitability, leverage, industry concentration (HHI) and state-
ownership over the same period of time. 
 
Finally, we use the 2005 stock split reform as an exogenous shock within our identification 
strategy to check whether or not our results are driven by this event. In April 2005, the 
Chinese government and the regulator (the CSRC) introduced the share reform plan by which 
it allowed non-tradable shares owned mainly by the government to be tradable. Therefore, we 
apply the difference-in-differences specification using the propensity score matched sample.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample during the period 1999-2009. 
We find that the average size for the board of directors and the supervisory board is 9.5 and 
4.19 directors/supervisors respectively. Moreover, the average proportion of INEDs on the 
board of directors is 32.7%. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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The average ROA and Tobin’s Q are 6.8% and 1.78 respectively and the average company 
size, measured by log total assets is 21.48 (2130 million RMB) whilst the average annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns is 70.3%. Table 2 also presents the CEOs’ 
characteristics for our sample. The average CEO age and tenure is 46.67 and 3.33 years 
respectively while the average proportions of female and politically connected CEOs are 
4.6% and 0.6% respectively. Moreover, the proportions of academics and foreign directors on 
the board of directors are 15.3% and 0.9 % respectively over the same period of time. 
Furthermore, the average directors’ and supervisors’ share ownership are 5.9% and 0.2% 
respectively. However, the average state ownership is 21.6%; whereas 0.6% of our sample 
companies are VC-backed. The average company age is 9.63 years and finally, the average 
ratios of debt to total assets and free cash flow to total assets are 45.2% and 8.1% respectively 
whilst 19.1% of our sample is fast growth companies.  
 
Table 3 presents a summary of board structure and governance characteristics for the Chinese 
IPOs over time since the IPO year.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
We find that the average board size decreases from 9.4 directors in the IPO year to around 9 
directors on year 12 post IPO whereas the supervisory board size increases from 4 to 4.3 
supervisors during the same period. Moreover, we notice an increase in the proportion of 
INEDs during the same period from 24.4% in the IPO year to 36.9% on year 12 post IPO. 
This reflects the impact of the published corporate governance guidelines with respect to 
board independence
8
.  
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We also notice that, consistent with the Chinese economic reform, the proportion of state 
share ownership decreases from 29.3% in the IPO year to 5.7% on year 12 post IPO. 
Moreover, directors’ ownership significantly decreases from 10.5% to 0.1% during the same 
period. Table 3 also reports that there is a slight increase in the average proportion of female 
CEOs from 4.1% in the IPO year to 5.1% in year 12 post IPO. Similarly, the average CEO 
tenure and age increased from 3.1 and 45.8 years in IPO year to 4.7 and 49.8 in year 12 post 
IPO. Finally, we notice a constant proportion of politically connected directors of 23% 
approximately over the same period of time while there is a remarkable increase in the 
average proportion of academics on the board of directors from 12.3% in the IPO year to 
18.6% in year 12 post IPO.   
 
In Table 4 we investigate whether there is a significant difference between board size and 
independence for both the supervisory board and the board of directors.  We split the sample 
based on median company size (big and small companies). We also split the sample based on 
growth potential (high and low growth companies) and finally based on the stock exchange 
where the IPOs were floated (Shanghai or Shenzhen).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 shows that big companies and those floated on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are 
characterised by a larger board of director size and a larger supervisory board size compared 
with small companies and those floated on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  By contrast, high 
growth companies are characterised by smaller board size and less independence. These 
results are consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. Moreover, Table 4 shows that big 
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companies and those floated in Shenzhen stock exchange have more independent boards 
compared with small companies and those floated in Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. 
The signs on the coefficients are in line with the literature on board structure. We find no 
evidence of multicollinearity problem. We also calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
for all fixed effects regressions and find that the mean VIF values range from 1.45 to 1.91 
suggesting that our models are not subject to severe multicollinearity problem. 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
 
6.2 The Scope of Operations Hypothesis. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the scope of operations hypothesis for the board of 
directors’ size (dependent variable) using both fixed effects and system GMM models as in 
Models 1-5 respectively. We include the lagged proportion of INEDs as an instrumental 
variable to control for endogeneity in Models 1-4 following Boone et al (2007). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
In Models 1-3, we control for the alternative proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis 
individually whilst in Model 4 the three measures are included. The results presented in 
Models 1-3 show that there is a positive and significant (p<1% and p<5%) relationship 
between the alternative proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis (log total assets, 
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company age and the leverage ratio) and board of directors’ size. This suggests that the 
greater the company size, company age and leverage ratio (higher degree of complex 
operations) the more directors there are on the board of directors.  In Model 4, we find that all 
the proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis are statistically significant. Moreover, in 
Model 5, the GMM estimation results also show a significant relationship between both 
company size and company age and the board of directors’ size. Therefore, our results are 
consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis with respect to the board of directors. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope 
of operations hypothesis with respect to the supervisory board size (dependent variable).  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Again, the results are consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis as the coefficients on 
the three proxies of the scope of operations hypothesis are positive and significant at the 1% 
level as in Models 1-3. Putting all proxies together in Model 4, we find that the coefficient on 
LogTA is positive and highly significant (p<1%); however, the coefficient on D/TA is 
insignificant. The results presented in Model 5 using the system GMM also support the scope 
of operations hypothesis for the supervisory board.  Interestingly, we find a positive and 
highly significant (p<1%) relationship between board of directors’ size and the supervisory 
board size. This suggests that the bigger the board of directors size, the bigger the supervisory 
board size and that the supervisory board size might be determined by the board of directors’ 
structure.  However, and importantly, we find a negative and significant relationship (p<1% 
and p<5% in Models 1-4) between the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors and 
supervisory board size
9
. This suggests that the higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller 
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the supervisory board size and this implies that the INEDs are perhaps a substituting 
mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. We argue that there might be a conflict in 
monitoring roles between the supervisory board and the INEDs. 
Table 8 presents the estimation results of the scope of operations hypothesis using the 
proportion of INEDs as a dependent variable.   
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
We find consistent results with those presented in Table 6 as the coefficients on the three 
proxies for the scope of operations hypothesis are positive, statistically (p<1%) and 
economically significant.  This suggests that more complex companies may have more 
independent boards and that the higher the leverage and the older the company the greater the 
board independence.  In Model 4, when we include all the three proxies, we also find a 
positive relationship with the proportion of INEDs; however, this relationship is highly 
significant with respect to company size and age. The results of the system GMM estimator 
(Model 5) are also consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis; however, we find that 
only company size is positively and significantly correlated with board independence.  We 
agree with Boone et al (2007) and Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2007) that including alternative 
proxies in the same regression model may lead to an attenuation bias and hence insignificant 
individual coefficients. In sum, the results presented in Models 1-5 are consistent with the 
scope of operations hypothesis. 
 
 In Tables 6 and 7, we notice the positive and significant relationship between the proportion 
of state share ownership and both board of directors and the supervisory board size. 
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Interestingly, in Table 8, we find a negative and highly significant relationship between state 
share ownership and the proportion of INEDs. This suggests that the greater the state share 
ownership, the larger the two boards and the lower the proportion of INEDs. This may 
suggest that state-owned companies may prefer to appoint supervisors on the supervisory 
board to carry out the monitoring role rather than appointing INEDs on the board of directors. 
This argument is consistent with Dahya et al (2003) as they argue that it is unlikely that 
supervisory boards will have an effective monitoring role as in reality they act as the voice of 
the government and the ruling party.  
 
Overall, the results presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8 support the scope of operations hypothesis 
for Chinese IPOs suggesting that complex and more mature companies have larger and more 
independent boards. Therefore, we cannot reject our first hypothesis. Finally, the models 
presented in Tables 6, 7and 8 are well specified as the F statistics are highly significant 
(p<1%) for all fixed effects models; in addition, the Hansen test does not reject the over-
identifying restrictions assumption and the results of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for 
the second order serial correlation are insignificant for the system GMM. 
6.3 Monitoring Hypothesis 
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the monitoring hypothesis using board of directors’ 
size as a dependent variable.  
Insert Table 9 about here 
The monitoring hypothesis predicts that there is a trade-off between directors’ private 
benefits and the cost of monitoring.  In Models 1 and 2, we present the results of the 
influence of directors’ private benefits proxied by companies’ free cash flow ratio and 
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industry concentration. As expected, we find a positive and highly significant (p<1%) 
relationship between the two proxies and board size. This suggests that the greater the 
directors’ private benefits the larger the board size. Our results are consistent with Jensen 
(1986) and Boone et al (2007) as they argue that directors may use cash flow to achieve 
private benefits rather than maximising shareholders’ wealth. Moreover, directors in highly 
concentrated industries have the power to consume private benefits as they are less subject to 
market discipline.   
On the other hand, we find consistent results with respect to the cost of monitoring proxied 
by the log of market-to-book ratio, the fast growth dummy and the proportion of directors’ 
ownership as we find - as expected - a negative and highly significant (p<1%) relationship 
between the three proxies and board size as presented in Models 3, 4 and 6. However, the 
fourth proxy for the cost of monitoring, namely the annualised standard deviation of daily 
stock returns is insignificant as in Model 5. These results are consistent with Boone et al 
(2007) as they suggest that in noisy environments e.g. fast growth, the cost of monitoring 
tends to be higher. Moreover, directors’ ownership mitigates agency conflicts that arise from 
high monitoring costs in fast growth industries.  In Models 7 and 8 we include all proxies for 
the monitoring hypothesis in the fixed effects and system GMM respectively. The results 
presented in Models 7 and 8 are consistent with the monitoring hypothesis with reasonably 
high statistical and economic significance. In Model 9, we include all proxies for the scope of 
operations and monitoring hypotheses in one regression. Again, we find consistent results 
(sign) with the two hypotheses; however the results are only significant at the 10% level with 
respect to the industry concentration variable measured by the Herfindahl index. This is 
mainly due to the attenuation bias resulting from including all the proxies in one regression 
model.  
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In Model 10, we estimate the monitoring hypothesis using the proportion of INEDs
10
. For 
brevity, we present the GMM estimation results which are found to be consistent with the 
monitoring hypothesis. Therefore, the results presented in Table 9 support our second and 
third hypotheses.  Interestingly we find a positive and highly significant (p<1%) relationship 
between the proportion of state share ownership and both board size (Models 1- 9); however, 
we find a negative and highly significant relationship with board independence (Model 10).  
This result is consistent with those presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8 and suggests the potential 
preference of the state to appoint supervisors rather than INEDs.  Finally, the results of the 
fixed effects and system GMM regressions are well specified as F statistics are highly 
significant and the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions.  
 
6.4 Negotiation Hypothesis 
The negotiation hypothesis posits that board composition is a trade-off between the CEOs’ 
power and the constraint on this power. Table 10 presents the results of the negotiation 
hypothesis for the Chinese IPOs. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
Model 1 presents the results of the influence of CEOs’ power on the proportion of INEDs. 
We use four alternative measures of CEOs’ influence namely CEO tenure, age, gender and 
state ownership. As expected, the results presented in Model 1 show that there is a negative 
and significant relationship (p<5% and p<1% respectively) between both CEO tenure and 
state share ownership and board independence. The negative influence of CEO tenure is 
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consistent with Boone et al (2007). This suggests that the longer the CEO tenure, the lower 
the proportion of INEDs and hence longer-tenured CEOs have more influence on appointing 
INEDs. The above results support our fourth hypothesis. 
 
However, we find a positive and significant (p<5%) relationship between both CEO age and 
gender and board independence. This suggests that the presence of young and female CEOs 
may correlate with a greater proportion of INEDs. Female directors are well documented in 
the literature as having a better monitoring role compared with their male counterparts as they 
have different opinions and perspectives (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In China, Cumming et 
al (2015) find evidence that female directors are more effective in reducing the frequency and 
severity of fraud in particular in male dominated industries. 
Model 2 presents the results of the constraints on CEOs’ influence proxied by CEO political 
connections, the proportion of academics on the board of directors and shares owned by 
supervisory board members. As expected by the negotiation hypothesis, we find a positive 
and highly significant (p<1%) relationship between the three proxies and the proportion of 
INEDs. This suggests that CEOs’ political connections and the presence of academics on the 
board of directors, in addition to the proportion of shares owned by the supervisory board 
members, may result in a greater proportion of INEDs. However, the economic significance 
of the proportion of shares owned by the supervisory board is the highest compared with the 
other two proxies. Again, the above results support our fifth hypothesis. Model 3, presents the 
results of combining both Models 1 and 2 i.e. CEOs’ influence and the constraints on their 
influence. We find consistent results with those presented in Models 1 and 2. 
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Model 4 presents the results of the negotiation hypothesis using system GMM to address the 
potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, we find consistent results with respect to CEO 
tenure, political connections, state share ownership and the proportion of shares owned by 
supervisors; however, the results are only significant at the 10% level for both state share 
ownership and the proportion of shares owned by supervisors. Moreover, we find that CEO 
gender and the proportion of academics have the same sign, though they are insignificant. 
Therefore, our results provide strong support for the negotiation hypothesis. In Models 5 and 
6 we present the results of the negotiation hypothesis in addition to the scope of operations 
and the monitoring hypotheses respectively.  We find consistent results with the scope of 
operations hypothesis, however, we find opposite signs with respect to the monitoring 
hypothesis; Boone et al (2007) argue that this is due to attenuation bias resulting from 
including multiple proxies in the same model. Finally, the results of fixed effects and system 
GMM regressions are well specified as F statistics for the fixed effects models are highly 
significant and the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions.  
 
6.5 The influence of board structure on financial performance 
Table 11 presents the fixed effects and GMM estimation results of the influence of board 
structure on financial performance. 
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
The results presented in Models 1 and 3, in which we use ROA as a dependent variable, show 
that there is a positive though insignificant relationship between board structure and financial 
performance. However, when using the Q ratio in Models 2 and 4, we find a positive and 
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significant relationship between the proportion of INEDs and financial performance. This 
result is consistent with Prevost et al (2002), and Cho and Rui (2009) and suggests that the 
higher the proportion of INEDs, the better the financial performance. In Model 2, we also 
find a positive and marginally significant relationship between the supervisory board size and 
financial performance. Again, we argue that there might be a conflict in the monitoring roles 
between INEDs and supervisors. The above results do not support our sixth hypothesis, but 
partially support the seventh hypothesis. 
 
 Finally, our models are well-specified as F statistics for the fixed effects models are highly 
significant and the tests regarding serial correlation for the system GMM estimator reject the 
absence of first order, but not the second order serial correlation. Moreover, the Hansen test 
does not reject the over-identifying restrictions.  
 
6.6 Robustness Tests  
6.6.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
We further address endogeneity concerns by using the PSM technique to control for 
observable differences in company and industry characteristics. Using the nearest neighbour 
technique with replacement and common support and within a maximum distance of 1% 
following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Abadie and Imbens (2006), we match our 
sample of IPOs (treatment) with that of non- IPOs (control) with similar characteristics 
namely size, profitability, leverage, industry concentration (HHI) and state ownership over 
the same period of time. Table 12 presents the univariate analysis for the difference in means 
test between IPO and non-IPO samples using the matching variables. The results presented in 
Table 12 show that there is no significant difference between treated and control samples 
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with respect to the matching variables and that our matched sample is balanced over those 
variables.  
Insert Table 12 about here 
We present in Table 13 the estimation results of the scope of operations hypothesis using the 
PSM matched sample for the board of directors’ size and independence and the supervisory 
board size.  
Insert Table 13 about here 
We firstly apply the probit model (Model 1) to investigate the main determinants of IPOs 
following the study of Pagano et al (1998). We use company size, profitability, leverage and 
growth opportunities, in addition to year and industry dummies to estimate the probit model. 
Moreover, we control for the proportion of state ownership as a distinguishing feature of the 
Chinese market. We find that big company size, profitability and lower leverage are the main 
determinants for the Chinese companies to go public. We also find that there is a significant 
difference in board structure and independence for IPOs compared with non-IPOs as the 
coefficient on the IPO dummy is significant in Models 2, 3 and 4. The results presented in 
Models 2 and 3 suggest that boards of directors tend to be larger; however supervisory boards 
tend to be smaller for IPOs. Moreover, in Model 4, we find that IPOs’ boards are marginally 
more independent compared with non- IPOs. We argue that IPOs tend to increase their board 
independence to comply with corporate governance best practice. Furthermore, the results 
presented in Table 13are consistent with the scope of operations hypothesis
11
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6.6.2 Stock Split Reform Exogenous Shock 
33 
 
 
We use the 2005 stock split reform as an exogenous shock within our identification strategy 
to further check whether or not our results are derived from the stock split and economic 
reform. Table 14 presents the results of our experiment using difference-in-differences 
specification for the scope of operations hypothesis using the propensity score matched 
sample. We present the results of the scope of operations hypothesis using three  dependent 
variables namely board of directors’ size, supervisory board size and board independence as 
in Panels A, B and C respectively. 
Insert Table 14 about here 
Our treatment and control groups are IPOs and non-IPOs respectively. We control for post 
reform period using a dummy variable (Post Reform) which takes the value of 1 post stock 
split reform and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we control for the interaction term (IPO*Post 
Reform) as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs post reform and 0 otherwise. 
In Panels A and B, we notice that the coefficients on the Post Reform dummy are negative 
and highly significant. This suggests that board of directors’ size and supervisory board size 
tend to be smaller post stock split reform.  However, and consistent with the calls for more 
independent boards, the proportion of INEDs tends to be higher post reform as the coefficient 
on the Post Reform dummy is positive and highly significant in Panel C. We also find that the 
coefficients on the interaction term (IPO*Post Reform) are insignificant in all Models 
suggesting that the changes in board size and independence and supervisory board size pre 
and post stock split reform are not driving our findings on the scope of operations 
hypothesis
12
.  
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Furthermore, as another robustness test, we calculate the annual changes in board structure 
around the IPO year and re-estimate all the regressions for the three hypotheses. Again, we 
find consistent results with the scope of operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses.  
Finally, we use different proxies for the constraints on CEO’ influence e.g. the presence of 
VC and the proportion of foreign directors on boards and obtain similar results with respect 
to the three hypotheses
13
.  
  
7. Summary, Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper we investigate the main board structure hypotheses namely the scope of 
operations, monitoring and negotiation hypotheses for a sample of Chinese IPOs floated in 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our results are consistent with the scope of 
operations hypothesis and suggest that a higher degree of a company’s complex operations 
results in greater board size and independence. We also find evidence of the scope of 
operations hypothesis with respect to the supervisory board size and that more complex 
companies may have larger supervisory boards. Moreover, we find that the larger the board 
size, the larger the supervisory board size and this implies that more supervisors might be 
required to oversee and monitor a larger board of directors.  Interestingly, we find that the 
higher the proportion of INEDs, the smaller the supervisory board size and this implies that 
INEDs are perhaps a substituting mechanism for the supervisors’ monitoring role. 
 
The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of 
state share ownership and both board size and the supervisory board size. However, we find a 
negative and significant relationship between state share ownership and the proportion of 
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INEDs. This suggests that the state - as a controlling shareholder - may influence and enforce 
the appointment of the supervisors on the supervisory board to carry out the monitoring role 
rather than appointing INEDs on the board of directors. This argument is consistent with 
Dahya et al (2003) as they argue that supervisors in reality act as the voice of the government 
and the ruling party. Therefore, we argue that there might be a conflict in the monitoring roles 
between the supervisory board and INEDs. 
We also find evidence of the monitoring hypothesis for Chinese IPOs. Our results are 
consistent with Jensen (1986) and Boone et al (2007) and show that the greater the directors’ 
private benefits, the larger the board size. Moreover, directors in highly concentrated 
industries may have the power to consume private benefits as they are less subject to market 
discipline. In addition, we find that in noisy environments e.g. fast growth, the cost of 
monitoring tends to be higher. Therefore, Chinese IPOs’ board structure is determined as a 
trade-off between directors’ private benefits and the cost of monitoring.  
Furthermore, we find evidence of the negotiation hypothesis as we find that longer tenured 
CEOs would tend to influence the appointment of INEDs and that the longer the CEO tenure 
the less the proportion of INEDs on the board of directors.  On the other hand, we find that 
the greater the CEOs’ political connections and the greater the proportion of shares owned by 
the supervisory board members, the greater the proportion of INEDs on the board of 
directors. Therefore, board structure for Chinese IPOs is an outcome of CEOs’ influence and 
the constraints on this influence.   
 
According to the Chinese Company Law, supervisory board members should be elected by 
shareholders to oversee and monitor the board of directors - mainly executive directors - to 
mitigate any agency conflict. However, the supervisory board has no actual power to exercise 
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this role (Clarke, 2006). On the other hand, the board of directors is comprised - in addition to 
executive directors - of INEDs to monitor and advise directors and to protect the overall 
interests of the company and minority shareholders in particular. The Chinese dual board 
mechanism was inspired by the German governance mechanism; however, there are 
fundamental differences between the two models (Wang, 2008). The supervisory board in 
Germany has much more power compared with the Chinese one including the appointment 
and removal of directors on the management board. Moreover, the German management 
board reports to the supervisory board as there is a hierarchical relationship between the two 
boards. In such a mechanism, the oversight role is deemed to be a function of the supervisory 
board due to the relationship between the two boards. Such a hierarchical relationship does 
not exist in China. Therefore, it is hard for a supervisory board without much power to 
exercise effective supervision of the board of directors in China (Wang, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, we argue that whilst the Chinese regulator (CSRC) issued guidelines on 
the introduction of independent directors (CSRC, 2001b) to enhance the overall board 
effectiveness and monitoring role, more comprehensive reform is required. Lu (2005) argues 
that “In conclusion, in China so far, the introduction of independent directors does not 
guarantee the effective operation of boards. Since the establishment of the board of 
supervisors system has not been able to fully play a supervisory role in companies, sufficient 
conditions do not exist for the independent directors to play their roles. In this situation, 
listed companies have been able to invite independent directors who are independent in name 
only.”  
Furthermore, Clarke (2006) argues that the supervisory board in China plays no significant 
role in corporate governance and the vast majority of companies tend to maintain the 
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supervisory board with the minimum required number of three supervisors (Clarke, 2006). 
More importantly, the qualifications of the supervisory board members are another concern
14
 
as most of the supervisors are more politically connected e.g. leaders of unions and political 
officers (Tenev et al., 2002 and Dahya et al., 2003). Li (2010) argues that there is no effective 
legal environment or effective governance mechanism to protect investor and minority 
shareholders in China. Berkman et al (2014) conclude that enhancing the managerial 
expertise of controlling shareholders may result in a more effective corporate governance 
mechanism in China. 
 
To sum up, the Chinese governance mechanism combines the German model with the Anglo-
Saxon model. This may create a conflict between boards of directors and supervisory boards 
leading to an overlap of duties and the monitoring role in particular. More importantly, it 
dilutes the power of both boards and increases directors’ and supervisors’ compensation 
schemes (CFA Institute, 2007). Therefore, the governance mechanism followed by Chinese 
companies is a quasi-two-tier structure (CFA Institute, 2007). Our results reveal the need for 
the regulator to reconsider the roles of either INEDs or the supervisory board members for - 
at least - listed companies or non-state-owned companies within a comprehensive reform of 
the Chinese governance mechanism.  This is due to the clear conflict in the monitoring role 
between the supervisory board and the INEDs on the board of directors.  
 
 
Endnotes
                                                          
1
 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf 
2
There was a total of 414 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) made in China over the period 2001 – 2008 with a total 
of RMB 508.6 billion being raised. Moreover, 345 and 278 IPOs were launched in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) respectively during 2010-2011. For more detail, see 
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Ernst &Young (2012), ‘Global IPO Trends Report 2010-2012: Prepare early, move fast,’ and the websites of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
3 At the end of May 2013, 269 Chinese firms had withdrawn their IPO applications, while 666 firms had their 
IPO plans under review by the CSRC. 
4
 The main responsibilities of the board of directors according to Article 46 of the Chinese Company law revised 
in 2003 are: “to convene the general meeting and to report on its work to the board of shareholders; to 
implement the resolutions of the general meeting; to decide on the business plans and investment plans of the 
company;  to formulate the company's proposed annual financial budgets and final accounts; to formulate the 
company’s profit distribution plans and plans for making up losses; to formulate plans for the company’s 
increase or reduction of the registered capital or for the issuance of corporate bonds; to formulate plans for the 
merger, division, dissolution or change of corporate form of the company; to decide on the establishment of the 
company's internal management organization; to decide on the employment or dismissal of the manager of the 
company and his remuneration, and to decide on the employment or dismissal of the deputy manager(s) and 
person(s) in charge of financial affairs of the company according to the recommendations of the manager and 
on their remuneration; to formulate the basic management system of the company; and other functions and 
powers specified in the articles of association of the company.” 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html#_Toc381707446 
5
 http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html 
6
 The System GMM estimator combines in a system the equation in first-differences with the same equation 
expressed in levels. 
7 Although this may cause the problem of weak instruments as the number of lags increases (Wintoki et al., 
2012). However, we used different lag lengths as an empirical trade-off.  
8
 The Guidelines for INEDs on the board of directors of listed companies states that “By June 30th, 2002, at 
least two members of the board of directors shall be independent directors; and by June 30th, 2003, at least one 
third of board shall be independent directors”. For more details, see 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.html 
9
 We also control for the proportion of executive directors on the board of directors instead of INEDs as we 
believe that the monitoring role of the supervisory board may increase with the proportion of executive directors 
on the board of directors. We find that the proportion of executive directors on the board of directors is 
positively and significantly correlated with the supervisory board size. 
10
 We also find consistent results with the monitoring hypothesis with respect to the supervisory board, however, 
for brevity and to save space, we did not present the results. 
11
 We find similar results with respect to the monitoring and negotiation hypotheses. 
12
 We find similar results with respect to the monitoring and negotiation hypotheses. 
13
 We also use Newey West and random effects models and obtained similar results to those of the fixed effects 
models.   
14
 According to the CFA Institute, the results of a survey conducted in 1999 reveal that supervisory boards’ 
members do not have the experience to supervise the board of directors. Moreover, they are not involved in the 
selection of board directors (CFA Institute, 2007).   
39 
 
 
References 
 
Abadie, A., and G. W. Imbens. 2006. “Large sample properties of matching estimators for average 
treatment effects.” Econometrica 74 (1): 235–267. 
Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2007. “A theory of friendly boards.” The Journal of Finance 62 (1): 
217–250.  
Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2009. “Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Governance and 
Performance.” Journal of Financial Economics 94 (2): 291–309. 
Agrawal, A., and C. Knoeber. 2001. “Do some outside directors play a political role?” Journal of Law 
and Economics 44 (1): 179–198. 
Arellano, M., and S. Bond. 1991. “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations.” The Review of Economic Studies 58 (2): 277‒
297. 
Baker, M., and P. Gompers. 2003. “The determinants of board structure at the initial public offering.” 
Journal of Law and Economics 46 (2): 569–598. 
Berkman, H., R. A. Cole, and L. J. Fu. 2014. “Improving corporate governance where the State is the 
controlling block holder: evidence from China.” The European Journal of Finance 20 (7-9): 
752–777. 
Bezemer, P. J., S. Peij, L. de Kruijs, and G. Maassen. 2014. “How two-tier boards can be more 
effective.” Corporate Governance 14 (1): 15–31. 
Bhagat, S., and B. Black. 1999. “The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm 
performance.” Business Lawyer 54 (3): 921–963. 
Blundell, R., and S. Bond. 1998. “Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models.” Journal of Econometrics 87 (1): 115‒143. 
Boone, A. L., L. C. Field, J. M. Karpoff, and C. G. Raheja. 2007. “The determinants of corporate 
board size and composition: An empirical analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics 85 (1): 
66–101. 
Butler, A. W., M. O. C. Keefe, and R. Kieschnick. 2014. “Robust determinants of IPO underpricing 
and their implications for IPO research.” Journal of Corporate Finance 27: 367–383. 
CFA Institute. 2007. Centre for Financial Markets Integrity, China Corporate Governance Survey, 
April, Vol. 2007, 3,pp 1-17 http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2007.n3.4563 
Chancharat, N., C. Krishnamurti, and G. Tian. 2012. “Board structure and survival of new economy 
IPO firms.” Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (2): 144–163. 
Chang, E. C., and S. M. L. Wong. 2009. “Governance with multiple objectives: Evidence from top 
executive turnover in China.” Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (2): 230–244. 
Chen, C.H., and B. Al-Najjar. 2012. “The determinants of board size and independence: Evidence 
from China.” International Business Review 21 (5): 831‒846. 
Cheng, S. 2008. “Board size and the variability of corporate performance.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 87 (1): 157‒176. 
Cho, S., and O. M. Rui. 2009. “Exploring the effects of China's two-tier board system and ownership 
structure on firm performance and earnings informativeness.” Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 16 (1): 95‒117. 
Clarke, D. C. 2006. “The independent director in Chinese corporate governance.” Delaware Journal 
of Corporate Law 31 (1): 125‒228. 
Coles, J.L., N.D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. “Boards: Does one size fit all?” Journal of Financial 
Economics 87 (2): 329‒356. 
Company Law. 2013. The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing: The Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress. 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html 
CSRC. 2001a. “Code of corporate governance for listed companies in China.” Issued jointly with the 
State Economic and Trade Commission. 
CSRC. 2001b. “Guidelines for establishing independent directors of listed companies.” Beijing: 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. 
40 
 
 
Cumming, D.J., Leung T. Y., and O.M. Rui. 2015. “Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud.” 
Academy of Management Journal 58 (5): 1572-1593. 
Dahya, J., Y. Karbhari, J. Z. Xiao, and M. Yang. 2003. “The usefulness of the supervisory board 
report in China.” Corporate Governance: an International Review 11 (4): 308‒321. 
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. “The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences.” 
Journal of Political Economy 93 (6): 1155–1177 
Ernst &Young (2012), ‘Global IPO Trends Report 2010-2012: Prepare early, move fast,’. 
Fama, E., and M. Jensen. 1983. “Separation of ownership and control.” Journal of Law and 
Economics 26 (2): 301–325. 
Fan, J. P., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. “Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and 
Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms.” Journal of financial 
economics 84 (2): 330–357. 
Farag, H. and C.A. Mallin. 2016. “The Impact of the Dual Board Structure and Board Diversity: 
Evidence from Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).” Journal of Business Ethics 139 (2): 
333–349. 
Firth, M., P. M. Fung, and O. M. Rui. 2007. “Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the 
informativeness of earnings–Evidence from China.” Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 26 (4): 463–496. 
Firth, M., C. Lin, P. Liu, and S.M. Wong. 2009. “Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in 
China’s private sector.” Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (6): 1144‒1155. 
Gillan, S., J. Hartzell, and L. Starks. 2004. “Explaining corporate governance: boards, bylaws, and 
charter provisions.” Unpublished working paper, University of Texas 
Guest, P.M. 2008. “The determinants of board size and composition: Evidence from the UK.” 
Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (1): 51‒72. 
Guest, P. M. 2009. “The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK.” The 
European Journal of Finance 15 (4): 385‒404. 
Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach. 1998. “Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their 
monitoring of the CEO.” American Economic Review 88 (1): 96–118. 
Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach. 2003. “Board of directors as an endogenously-determined 
institution: a survey of the economic literature.” Economic Policy Review 9 (1): 7–26. 
Jensen, M. 1986. “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.” American 
Economic Review 76 (2): 323–329. 
Jensen, M. 1993. “The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems.” 
Journal of Finance 48 (83):831 –880. 
Kato, T., and C. Long. 2006. “CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: 
Evidence from micro data.” Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4): 796‒717. 
Lehn, K.M., S. Patro, and M. Zhao. 2009. “Determinants of the Size and Composition of US 
Corporate Boards: 1935‐2000.” Financial Management 38 (4): 747‒780. 
Li, G. 2010. “The pervasiveness and severity of tunneling by controlling shareholders in China.” 
China Economic Review 21 (2): 310‒323. 
Li, J., and Y.I. Tang. 2010. “CEO hubris and firm risk taking in China: The moderating role of 
managerial discretion.” Academy of Management Journal 53 (1): 45‒68. 
Li, L., and T. Naughton. 2007. “Going public with good governance: evidence from China.” 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 15 (6): 1190‒1202. 
Li, P., S. Parsa, G. Tang, and J. Z. Xiao. 2012. “Is there an expectations gap in the roles of 
independent directors? An explorative study of listed Chinese companies.” British Journal of 
Management 23 (2): 206‒222. 
 Linck, J.S., J.M. Netter, and T. Yang. 2008. “The determinants of board structure.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 87 (2): 308‒328. 
Lu, T. 2005. “Defects in China’s Independent Director System: A Case Study of Leshan Power 
Company.”  Unpublished working paper. 
Lubotsky, D., and M. Wittenberg. 2007. “Interpretation of regressions with multiple proxies.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 88 (3): 549–562. 
41 
 
 
Ma, J., and T. Khanna. 2015. “Independent directors' dissent on boards: Evidence from listed 
companies in China.” Strategic Management Journal, forthcoming, DOI: 10.1002/smj.2421 
Omran, M. 2009. “Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private 
ownership concentration, identity and board composition.” Journal of comparative 
Economics 37 (4): 658–673. 
Pagano, M., F. Panetta, and L. Zingales. 1998. “Why do companies go public? An empirical 
analysis.” The Journal of Finance 53 (1): 27–64. 
Pathan, S. 2009. “Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking.” Journal of Banking & Finance 
33 (7): 1340‒1350. 
Peng, M. W. 2004. “Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions”, 
Strategic Management Journal 25(5): 435–471. 
Pessarossi, P., and L. Weill. 2013. “Does CEO turnover matter in China? Evidence from the stock 
market.” Journal of Economics and Business 70: 27–42. 
Prevost, A. K., R. P. Rao, and M. Hossain. 2002. “Determinants of board composition in New 
Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach.” Journal of Empirical Finance 9 (4): 373‒397. 
Raheja, C. G. 2005. “Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards.” 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40 (2): 283‒306. 
Roodman, D. 2009. “How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata.” 
Stata Journal 9 (1): 86‒136. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55. 
Sah, R.K., and J. Stiglitz. 1991. “The quality of managers in centralized versus decentralized 
organizations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1): 289–295. 
Sun, Q., and W. Tong. 2003. “China share issue privatization: The extent of its success.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 70 (2): 183‒222. 
Tenev, S., C. Zhang, and L. Brefort. 2002. “Corporate governance and enterprise reform in China: 
Building the institutions of modern markets.” World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation Publications. Washington, D.C. USA. 
Wang, J. 2008. “The strange role of independent directors in a two-tier board structure of China's 
listed companies.” Compliance and Regulatory Journal 3: 47–55. 
Wintoki, M. B., J. S. Linck, and J. M. Netter. 2012. “Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal 
corporate governance.” Journal of Financial Economics 105 (3): 581‒606. 
Xiao, J. Z., J. Dahya, and Z. Lin. 2004. “A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the 
Supervisory Board in China.” British Journal of Management 15 (1): 39–55. 
Xu, L., and K. B. Oh. 2011. “The stock market in China: An endogenous adjustment process 
responding to the demands of economic reform and growth.” Journal of Asian Economics 22 
(1): 36–47. 
Yang, J., J. Chi, and M. Young. 2011. “A review of corporate governance in China.” Asian‐Pacific 
Economic Literature 25 (1): 15–28. 
Yermack, D. 1996. “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.” Journal 
of Financial Economics 40 (2): 185–211. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
Table 1: Variables Description 
Variable Description 
Academics Proportion of academics on the board of directors  
B.size Board of directors’ size measured by the number of directors on the board of 
directors. 
CEO Tenure Board experience defined as the length of time served on the current board. 
CEOage CEO age measured by years.  
CEOPolcon Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 
0 otherwise.  
Coage Company age since its establishment year.  
D/TA Total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage. 
DirOwn Proportion of shares held by directors. 
FCF Free cash flow to total assets ratio measured as (earnings plus depreciation 
minus capital expenditures) / total assets.  
FemCEO Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise.  
Foreign Proportion of foreign directors on the board of directors. 
Growth Dummy variable equals to one for fast growth companies and 0 otherwise.  
HHI Industry concentration measured by the Herfindahl index. Herfindahl index 
constructed by the sales ratio of the companies in the same industry. 
INED Percentage of independent non-executive directors.  
IPO Dummy variable takes the value of 1 for IPOs and 0 for non-IPOs. 
IPO*Post Reform Dummy variable takes the value of 1 for IPOs post stock split reform and 0 
otherwise. 
L.B.size Lagged board of directors’ size. 
L.INED Lagged proportion of independent non-executive directors. 
L.ROA Lagged ROA. 
L.SB.size Lagged supervisory board size. 
LogMTB Natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio calculated as (book value of debt + 
market value of equity) / book value of assets).   
LogTA Natural logarithm of company’s total assets as a proxy for company size. 
PolconBoD Proportion of politically connected directors on the board of directors.  
Post Reform Dummy variable takes the value of 1 post stock split reform and 0 otherwise. 
ROA Return on assets calculated as (net profits + financial expenses)/average total 
assets. 
SB.size Supervisory board size measured by the number of supervisors on the 
supervisory board.  
Sdsrtn Annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns for each IPO year. Daily 
stock returns are calculated as the first difference in the natural logarithm of 
the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, 
rights issues, stock dividends, and stock splits. 
StateOwn Percentage of State share ownership.  
SupOwn Proportion of shares held by supervisors. 
Tobin’s Q Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value of debt and the 
book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets). 
VC Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the company is venture capital 
backed and 0 otherwise. 
Data is collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database which is 
designed and developed by GTA Information Technology Corporation. 
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   Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample 
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
B.size 9.501 9.000 2.005 5.000 19.000 
SB.size 4.193 3.000 1.555 3.000 15.000 
INED 0.327 0.333 0.102 0.000 0.800 
ROA 0.068 0.059 0.089 -1.674 1.789 
Tobin’s Q 1.786 1.368 1.188 0.464 15.929 
LogTA 21.480 21.236 1.239 17.272 28.405 
Sdsrtn 0.703 0.463 1.208 0.002 4.465 
CEOage 46.672 46.000 6.701 24.000 77.000 
CEO Tenure 3.332 3.000 1.692 1.000 20.000 
FemCEO 0.046 0.000 0.187 0.000 1.000 
CEOPolcon 0.006 0.000 0.077 0.000 1.000 
PolconBoD 0.232 0.222 0.187 0.000 1.000 
Academics 0.153 0.111 0.1659 0.000 0.950 
Foreign 0.009 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.778 
DirOwn 0.059 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.748 
SupOwn 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.271 
StateOwn 0.216 0.015 0.266 0.000 0.863 
VC 0.006 0.000 0.076 0.000 1.000 
Coage 9.632 9.000 4.189 1.000 25.000 
D/TA 0.452 0.451 0.198 0.003 1.179 
FCF 0.081 0.079 0.093 -0.315 0.867 
MTB 1.710 1.368 1.211 0.420 31.031 
HHI 0.075 0.410 0.095 0.014 0.851 
Growth 0.191 0.000 0.393 0.000 1.000 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample during the period 1999-2009. Please see 
variables definition in Table 1. 
 
    
   Table 3: Board Structure and Governance Characteristics for IPOs 
 Year from IPO 
 IPO year Year 3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year 12 
B.size 9.489 9.607 9.620 9.466 9.339 9.077 
SB.size 4.037 4.141 4.257 4.273 4.339 4.321 
INED 0.244 0.341 0.349 0.356 0.361 0.369 
StateOwn 0.293 0.220 0.221 0.193 0.101 0.057 
DirOwn 0.105 0.088 0.045 0.020 0.004 0.001 
FemCEO 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.025 0.041 0.051 
CEO Tenure 3.147 3.306 3.520 3.164 3.336 4.750 
CEOage 45.810 46.481 46.819 46.678 47.802 49.805 
PolconBoD 0.228 0.230 0.238 0.233 0.226 0.229 
Academics 12.364 17.021 16.408 15.306 16.760 18.673 
Obs 892 783 596 410 277 212 
Table 3 presents a summary of board structure and governance characteristics for the Chinese IPOs over time 
since the IPO year. Please see variables definition in Table 1. 
 
44 
 
 
Table 4: Univariate Analysis of Board Size and Independence for the Supervisory 
Board and the Board of Directors 
 Big Size Small Size High Growth Low Growth SSE SZSE 
B.size 12.877 9.058 9.227 9.566 9.678 9.247 
t- statistics 11.020
***
 -5.965
***
 9.536
***
 
SB.size 5.115 3.832 3.933 4.254 4.353 3.961 
t- statistics 10.070
***
 -7.297
***
 11.169
***
    
INED 0.376 0.343 0.326 0.335 0.325 0.331 
t- statistics 3.231
***
 -7.598
***
 -12.331
***
 
The Table presents the results of the univariate analysis of board size and independence for both the supervisory 
board and the board of directors. The univariate analysis is designed to compare the median of company size 
(big and small companies), growth potential (high and low growth companies) and stock exchange (Shanghai, 
(SSE) and Shenzhen, (SZSE)). Please see variables definition in Table 1. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 B.size INED SB. 
Size 
Acdm LogTA Coage D/TA FCF HHI Log 
MTB 
Sdsrtn Growth Dir 
Own 
B.size 1.000             
INED -0.132 1.000            
SB.size 0.288 -0.074 1.000           
Academics -0.032 0.307 0.033 1.000          
LogTA 0.221 0.184 0.189 0.147 1.000         
Coage 0.054 0.352 0.025 0.108 0.221 1.000        
D/TA 0.073 0.139 0.089 0.041 0.385 0.231 1.000       
FCF 0.080 0.016 0.044 0.026 0.168 -0.070 -0.232 1.000      
HHI 0.100 0.004 0.161 0.066 0.196 -0.104 -0.017 0.121 1.000     
LogMTB -0.131 0.004 -0.087 0.063 -0.325 0.092 -0.270 0.088 -0.016 1.000    
Sdsrtn 0.010 -0.191 -0.024 -0.047 -0.138 -0.174 -0.097 0.025 0.010 0.071 1.000   
Growth -0.067 0.044 -0.081 0.048 -0.178 -0.046 -0.227 0.004 0.070 0.198 0.020 1.000  
DirOwn -0.160 0.143 -0.198 0.078 -0.181 -0.107 -0.209 0.049 -0.019 0.110 0.067 0.143 1.000 
StateOwn 0.212 -0.239 0.213 -0.080 0.089 -0.348 0.018 0.052 0.116 -0.304 0.054 -0.121 -0.314 
SupOwn -0.061 0.048 -0.043 0.037 -0.102 -0.074 -0.097 0.030 -0.018 0.033 0.076 0.075 0.374 
ROA 0.035 -0.017 0.006 0.035 0.086 -0.050 -0.256 0.419 0.091 0.185 0.041 0.040 0.088 
Tobin’s Q -0.106 0.036 -0.064 0.068 -0.252 0.106 -0.222 0.094 -0.014 0.918 0.028 0.178 0.068 
FemCEO -0.063 0.029 -0.038 0.016 -0.047 0.018 -0.025 -0.020 -0.028 0.044 0.020 -0.005 0.083 
CEO Tenure 0.010 -0.015 -0.0002 0.029 0.077 0.059 -0.040 0.034 0.045 0.009 -0.048 0.035 0.028 
VC -0.017 0.005 -0.018 0.039 0.000 0.014 -0.031 0.0003 -0.014 0.006 0.037 0.010 0.062 
CEOage 0.084 0.054 0.034 0.060 0.187 0.120 0.027 0.045 0.041 -0.002 -0.032 -0.043 -0.062 
CEOPolcon 0.014 0.012 0.033 0.013 0.028 -0.032 0.017 -0.002 -0.003 -0.025 0.005 -0.016 -0.018 
PolconBoD 0.112 0.050 0.068 0.121 0.232 -0.013 0.040 0.074 0.129 -0.082 -0.035 -0.067 -0.079 
Foreign 0.040 -0.059 -0.035 -0.010 0.018 0.021 -0.036 0.047 -0.040 0.003 0.023 0.011 0.019 
The Table presents the correlation matrix for the variables included in the empirical analysis. Please see variables definition 
in Table 1. Bold figures indicate significance at the 5% level or below. 
 
 StateOwn SupOwn ROA Tobin’s Q Fem 
CEO 
CEO 
Tenure 
VC CEO 
age 
CEO 
Polcon 
Polcon 
BoD 
Foreign 
StateOwn 1.000           
SupOwn -0.130 1.000          
ROA 0.003 0.039 1.000         
Tobin’s Q -0.250 0.012 0.175 1.000        
FemCEO -0.051 0.022 0.015 0.040 1.000       
CEO Tenure -0.074 -0.007 0.038 0.003 0.008 1.000      
VC -0.039 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.012 0.037 1.000     
CEO age 0.021 -0.003 0.049 -0.006 -0.002 0.102 0.006 1.000    
CEOPolcon 0.055 0.072 -0.010 -0.022 -0.006 0.009 0.016 0.049 1.000   
PolconBoD 0.098 -0.055 0.050 -0.064 0.010 0.010 -0.007 0.086 0.037 1.000  
Foreign -0.077 -0.001 0.041 -0.003 0.035 -0.007 0.022 0.068 -0.017 -0.059 1.000 
Please see variables definition in Table 1. Bold figures indicate significance at the 5% level or below. 
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Table 6: Tests for the Scope of Operations Hypothesis for the Board of Directors Size 
Using Fixed Effects and System GMM Estimator 
BSize Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L.B.size     0.797
***
 
(0.047) 
LogTA 0.394
***
 
(0.023) 
  0.379
***
 
(0.024) 
0.160
***
 
(0.031) 
Coage  0.016
**
 
(0.008) 
 0.012
*
 
(0.007) 
0.036
***
 
(0.013) 
D/TA   1.076
***
 
(0.128) 
0.260
**
 
(0.127) 
-0.474 
(0.446) 
StateOwn 1.065
***
 
(0.099) 
1.451
***
 
(0.101) 
1.323
***
 
(0.100) 
1.091
***
 
(0.100) 
0.227 
(0.229) 
L.INED 
-2.794
***
 
(0.281) 
-2.308
***
 
(0.279) 
-2.325
***
 
(0.277) 
-2.847
***
 
(0.283) 
 
INED 
    -7.149
***
 
(1.704) 
L.ROA 
0.321 
(0.201) 
1.282
***
 
(0.220) 
1.737
***
 
(0.255) 
0.470
**
 
(0.210) 
 
ROA 
    -1.535
*
 
(0.930) 
Cons 1.368
***
 
(0.490) 
9.180
***
 
(0.165) 
8.823
***
 
(0.165) 
1.470
***
 
(0.499) 
0.757 
(0.646) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.116 0.068 0.077 0.116  
F-Stat (p. value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 7021 7025 7022 7019 7037 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p.value 
    0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) p.value 
    0.685 
Hansen test  p.value     0.147 
The Table presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope of 
operations hypothesis using board of directors size as a dependent variable. Please see variables definition 
in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 Table 7: Tests for the Scope of Operations Hypothesis for the Supervisory Board Size 
Using Fixed Effects and System GMM Estimator 
SB.size Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L.SB.size     0.645
***
 
(0.034) 
L2.SB.size      0.113
***
 
(0.022) 
LogTA 0.164
***
 
(0.020) 
  0.165
***
 
(0.021) 
0.059
***
 
(0.015) 
Coage  0.021
***
 
(0.006) 
 0.021
***
 
(0.006) 
0.006
**
 
(0.003) 
D/TA   0.294
***
 
(0.100) 
-0.045 
(0.103) 
-0.278
**
 
(0.124) 
StateOwn 0.941
***
 
(0.078) 
1.116
***
 
(0.078) 
1.036
***
 
(0.079) 
1.001
***
 
(0.079) 
0.020 
(0.071) 
L.B.size 0.175
***
 
(0.010) 
0.194
***
 
(0.010) 
0.192
***
 
(0.010) 
0.174
***
 
(0.010) 
 
B.size     0.046
***
 
(0.017) 
L.INED -0.601
***
 
(0.180) 
-0.442
**
 
(0.179) 
-0.374
**
 
(0.178) 
-0.688
***
 
(0.181) 
 
INED     -0.371
*
 
(0.201) 
L.ROA 0.354
**
 
(0.177) 
0.026 
(0.177) 
0.138 
(0.192) 
-0.393
**
 
(0.179) 
 
ROA     -0.071 
(0.280) 
Cons -1.374
***
 
(0.418) 
1.597
***
 
(0.150) 
1.642
***
 
(0.151) 
-1.526
***
 
(0.426) 
-0.547
**
 
(0.274) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.130 0.119 0.118 0.131  
F-Stat (p. value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 7020 7024 7021 7018 6156 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p.value 
    0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) p.value 
    0.954 
Hansen test  p.value     0.360 
The Table presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope of 
operations hypothesis using supervisory board size as a dependent variable. Please see variables 
definition in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 8:  Tests for the Scope of Operations Hypothesis for the Board of Directors 
Independence Using Fixed Effects and System GMM Estimator 
INED Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
L.INED     0.599
***
 
(0.044) 
LogTA 0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
  0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
Coage  0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
 0.003
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
D/TA   0.015
***
 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
StateOwn -0.053
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.038
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.048
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.043
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
L.B.size -0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
 
B.size     -0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
L.ROA -0.017
*
 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.018
**
 
(0.009) 
 
ROA     0.001 
(0.021) 
Cons 0.140
***
 
(0.020) 
0.292
***
 
(0.010) 
0.311
***
 
(0.009) 
0.119
***
 
(0.020) 
0.123
***
 
(0.019) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.156 0.153 0.143 0.166  
F-Stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 7026 7030 7027 7024 6972 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
p.value 
    0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
p.value 
    0.137 
Hansen test  p.value     0.520 
The Table presents the results of both fixed effects and system GMM regressions for the scope of 
operations hypothesis using the proportion of INEDs as a dependent variable. Please see variables 
definition in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses.  
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   Table 9: Tests for the Monitoring Hypothesis for Board of Directors Size and Independence Using Fixed Effects and System GMM 
Estimator 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
L.B.size        0.802
***
 
(0.010) 
  
FCF 1.142
***
 
(0.276) 
     1.010
***
 
(0.320) 
1.604
***
 
(0.219) 
0.240 
(0.238) 
0.023
**
 
(0.009) 
HHI  1.486
***
 
(0.328) 
    1.245
***
 
(0.316) 
0.339
**
 
(0.142) 
0.512
*
 
(0.310) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
LogMTB   -0.115
***
 
(0.018) 
   -0.102
***
 
(0.019) 
-0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
Growth    -0.315
***
 
(0.057) 
  -0.230
***
 
(0.058) 
-0.283
***
 
(0.053) 
-0.055 
(0.058) 
-0.016
***
 
(0.004) 
Sdsrtn     0.003 
(0.030) 
 0.014 
(0.024) 
0.067
***
 
(0.024) 
0.051
***
 
(0.013) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
DirOwn      -1.524
***
 
(0.173) 
-1.447
***
 
(0.169) 
-0.121 
(0.133) 
-1.149
***
 
(0.165) 
-0.023
*
 
(0.013) 
 
LogTA         0.374
***
 
(0.026) 
 
Coage         0.007 
(0.008) 
 
D/TA         0.154 
(0.138) 
 
StateOwn 1.397
***
 
(0.100) 
1.406
***
 
(0.108) 
1.278
***
 
(0.102) 
1.346
***
 
(0.100) 
1.413
***
 
(0.100) 
1.141
***
 
(0.106) 
0.941
***
 
(0.118) 
0.388
***
 
(0.058) 
0.870
***
 
(0.116) 
-0.008
***
 
(0.003) 
L.INED -2.287
***
 
(0.280) 
-6.898
***
 
(0.453) 
-2.219
***
 
(0.278) 
-2.198
***
 
(0.279) 
-2.258
***
 
(0.277) 
-1.838
***
 
(0.284) 
-6.520
***
 
(0.455) 
 -7.626
***
 
(0.459) 
0.462
***
 
(0.022) 
INED        -5.019
***
 
(0.407) 
  
L.ROA 0.711
***
 
(0.239) 
1.099
***
 
(0.239) 
1.391
***
 
(0.222) 
1.309
***
 
(0.220) 
1.288
***
 
(0.218) 
1.417
***
 
(0.224) 
0.877
***
 
(0.246) 
 0.232 
(0.249) 
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ROA        -1.016
***
 
(0.205) 
 -0.003 
(0.005) 
Cons 9.270
***
 
(0.156) 
11.102
***
 
(0.215) 
9.492
***
 
(0.156) 
9.305
***
 
(0.153) 
9.288
***
 
(0.153) 
9.395
***
 
(0.155) 
11.366
***
 
(0.220) 
3.660
***
 
(0.209) 
3.731
***
 
(0.553) 
0.190
***
 
(0.011) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.071 0.106 0.072 0.071 0.069 0.076 0.124  0.165  
F-Stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 6993 6111 7021 7025 7005 7024 6067 6072 6066 5405 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p.value 
       0.000  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) p.value 
       0.182  0.820 
Hansen test  p.value        0.127  0.231 
The Table presents the fixed effects and system GMM estimation results for the monitoring hypothesis (the trade-off between directors’ private benefits and the cost of 
monitoring) using board of directors’ size as a dependent variable. In Model 10, we use the proportion of INEDs as a dependent variable. Please see variables definition in 
Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the 
parentheses.  
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Table 10: Tests for Negotiation Hypothesis for Board Independence Using Fixed Effects 
and System GMM Estimator  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CEO Tenure -0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
 -0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
CEOage 0.0005
**
 
(0.0002) 
 0.0003
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0004
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
FemCEO 0.012
**
 
(0.005) 
 0.012
**
 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
0.012
**
 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
CEOPolcon  0.030
***
 
(0.009) 
0.027
***
 
(0.009) 
0.024
***
 
(0.008) 
0.025
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.0001 
(0.008) 
StateOwn -0.047
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.041
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.041
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.009
*
 
(0.005) 
-0.036
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.003) 
Academics  0.001
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.001
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.001
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0003
***
 
(0.00005) 
SupOwn  0.273
***
 
(0.051) 
0.258
***
 
(0.050) 
0.224
*
 
(0.135) 
0.298
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.037 
(0.039) 
L.B.size -0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.006
***
 
(0.0004) 
L.ROA 0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.033) 
-0.021
**
 
(0.009) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.010) 
L.INED    0.396
***
 
(0.030) 
  
LogTA     0.007
***
 
(0.001) 
0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
Coage     0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
D/TA     -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.010
**
 
(0.004) 
FCF      -0.018
**
 
(0.008) 
HHI      -0.015
**
 
(0.007) 
LogMTB      0.009
***
 
(0.002) 
Growth      0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
Sdsrtn      0.001 
(0.001) 
Cons 0.305
***
 
(0.011) 
0.301
***
 
(0.009) 
0.297
***
 
(0.011) 
0.253
***
 
(0.019) 
0.153
***
 
(0.020) 
0.222
***
 
(0.018) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.141 0.196 0.195  0.210 0.109 
F-Stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 6886 7030 6886 6822 6881 5957 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p.value 
   0.000   
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) p.value 
   0.130   
Hansen test  p.value    0.478   
The Table presents the results of the negotiation hypothesis (the influence of CEOs’ power and the constraints 
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on CEOs’ power) for board of directors’ independence using fixed effects and system GMM estimator. Please 
see variables definition in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the parentheses.   
 
   
Table 11: The Influence of Board Structure on Financial Performance Using Fixed 
Effects and System GMM Estimator 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 ROA Tobin’s Q ROA Tobin’s Q 
L.ROA   0.508
***
 
(0.170) 
 
L.Tobin’s Q    -0.696** 
(0.355) 
B.size 0.0005 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.226 
(0.268) 
SB.size 0.0005 
(0.001) 
0.015
*
 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.587 
(0.465) 
INED 0.023 
(0.019) 
1.346
***
 
(0.304) 
0.536 
(0.352) 
4.743
**
 
(2.184) 
D/TA -0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.058 
(0.107) 
-0.015 
(0.040) 
2.151
**
 
(0.940) 
LogTA 0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.231
***
 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.857
***
 
(0.215) 
Sdsrtn 0.001
**
 
(0.0004) 
0.046
**
 
(0.020) 
0.018 
(0.021) 
1.198
**
 
(0.564) 
StateOwn 0.015
***
 
(0.003) 
0.950
***
 
(0.044) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
2.425
***
 
(0.874) 
VC 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.178
*
 
(0.107) 
0.092 
(0.123) 
22.934
**
 
(8.938) 
Foreign 0.057
***
 
(0.020) 
-0.042 
(0.291) 
0.107 
(0.143) 
7.347 
(8.404) 
PolconBoD 0.014
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.069) 
-0.033 
(0.079) 
10.158
***
 
(3.748) 
Cons -0.110
***
 
(0.026) 
5.709
***
 
(0.285) 
0.255
**
 
(0.112) 
1.809 
(5.463) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.056 0.149   
F-Stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 6363 6363 5890 5871 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
p.value 
  0.001 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
p.value 
  0.294 0.134 
Hansen test  p.value   0.448 0.208 
The Table presents the fixed effects and GMM estimation results of the influence of board structure on 
financial performance. Please see variables definition in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the company level are reported in the 
parentheses. 
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Table 12: Difference in Means Test between IPOs and non-IPOs for the PSM Matching 
Variables. 
Matching Variables Treated  Control t-stats 
Log TA 21.54 21.562 -0.94 
ROA 0.041 0.039 0.62 
D/TA 0.469 0.475 -1.21 
State Own 0.186 0.185 0.39 
HHI 0.075 0.073 1.41 
The Table presents the univariate analysis of the difference in means test between IPOs and 
non-IPOs for the variables used in the PSM.  Please see variables definition in Table 1. 
 
Table 13: Tests for the Scope of Operations Hypothesis Using Propensity Score 
Matched Sample  
 Probit 
Model IPO  
Board of 
Directors 
size 
Supervisory 
Board Size 
INEDs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
IPO  0.133
***
 
(0.031) 
-0.015
***
 
(0.004) 
0.002
*
 
(0.0012) 
Log TA 0.018
**
 
(0.008) 
0.479
***
 
(0.012) 
0.029
***
 
(0.002) 
0.003
***
 
(0.0004) 
D/TA -0.334
***
 
(0.036) 
0.030 
(0.026) 
0.006
**
 
(0.003) 
0.020
***
 
(0.001) 
ROA 0.043
**
 
(0.020) 
   
L.ROA  -0.125
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.006
**
 
(0.003) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
L.Bsize   0.034
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.006
***
 
(0.0002) 
L.INED  -10.381
***
 
(0.279) 
-0.211
***
 
(0.038) 
 
     
State Own -0.011 
(0.049) 
0.687
***
 
(0.075) 
0.153
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
HHI 0.072 
(0.100) 
   
Constant -0.671
***
 
(0.175) 
5.067
***
 
(0.383) 
0.810
***
 
(0.045) 
0.345
***
 
(0.011) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 15,728 13,435 13,175 13,287 
LR chi-sq (p.value) 0.000    
F-stat (p value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-sq 0.018    
Adj R-sq  0.250 0.213 0.144 
The Table presents the estimation outputs of the scope of operations hypothesis using the PSM 
matched sample for the board of directors’ size and independence and for the supervisory board size. 
Please see variables definition in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.  Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the parentheses.   
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Table 14: The Influence of Stock Split Reform on Board Structure   
   
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Board of directors size     Supervisory board 
size     
INEDs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IPO 0.194
***
 
(0.032) 
0.231
**
 
(0.094) 
-0.022
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.032
***
 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Post Reform -0.742
***
 
(0.086) 
-0.731
***
 
(0.090) 
-0.062
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.065
***
 
(0.011) 
0.022
***
 
(0.002) 
0.022
***
 
(0.002) 
IPO*Post Reform  -0.043 
(0.100) 
 0.011 
(0.012) 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
LogTA 0.480
***
 
(0.012) 
0.480
***
 
(0.012) 
0.030
***
 
(0.001) 
0.030
***
 
(0.001) 
0.004
***
 
(0.0004) 
0.004
***
 
(0.0004) 
D/TA 0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
State Own 0.587
***
 
(0.076) 
0.587
***
 
(0.076) 
0.141
***
 
(0.010) 
0.141
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.005
**
 
(0.002) 
-0.005
**
 
(0.002) 
L.ROA -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.005
***
 
(0.0002) 
-0.005
***
 
(0.0002) 
L.Bsize   0.033
***
 
(0.001) 
0.033
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.007
***
 
(0.0002) 
-0.007
***
 
(0.0002) 
L.INED -8.928
***
 
(0.258) 
-8.928
***
 
(0.258) 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
-0.006 
(0.034) 
  
Constant 4.276
***
 
(0.409) 
4.276
***
 
(0.409) 
0.791
***
 
(0.045) 
0.794
***
 
(0.045) 
0.346
***
 
(0.010) 
0.346
***
 
(0.010) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 
F-stat (p.value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj R-sq 0.240 0.240 0.210 0.210 0.101 0.101 
The Table presents the results of the difference-in-differences specification of the scope of operation hypothesis for the 
board of directors, the supervisory board size and board independence using the propensity score matched sample as in 
Panels A, B and C respectively. We use the 2005 stock split reform as an exogenous shock; we also use IPOs and non-
IPOs dummies as treatment and control groups respectively. Please see variables definition in Table 1. ***, **, and * 
indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses.   
 
 
